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The research aims to discover the causal factors that make some nations more
supportive of world order than others. Seven indicators of national support for world
order are identified. Scores on them and on a combined index for 114 nations are
obtained. Switzerland and three Scandinavian nations rank at the top, the United
States is at rank 40, and the Soviet Union at 72. Five significant causal factors are
identified, which yield a multiple correlation coefficient of .69 with the Index of
National Support for World Order. The most powerful predictor is the degree to
which citizens of a nation participate in international nongovernmental organizations.
Less powerful are national levels of enlightenment, urgency of foreign trade,
productivity relative to reference nations, and, negatively, population pressure.
in a time of recent vicious war in Southeast Asia, continuing tension in
the Middle East, and widespread disillusion with the United Nations, it
may seem quixotic to pursue research on factors conducive to national
support for world order. Yet, if it is a time of disappointing performance,
it is also a time of great need and encouraging potentiality. Nuclear
weapons pose a threat that makes men actively seek a global solution, and
modern communication and travel offer hopeful means for reaching the
minimum consensus necessary.
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The rationale of this research was stimulated by Charles H. Cooley’s
(1918: ch. 1) theory of &dquo;the tentative process.&dquo; He believed that, in the
growth of social institutions, there is constant experimentation, often
unconscious, as each institution copes with its problems. The successful
experiments survive and form the basis for further growth. Thus, the
future is embryonic in the present and is somewhat predictable if we can
foresee the crescive outcomes. This theory is here applied to nation-states.
It is assumed that some nations are in the forefront of experimentation
toward world order, that they are coping with the problem of making the
transition from narrow nationalism as the world has known it historically
to a more enlightened nationalism that will support world order. If the
world is to become &dquo;spaceship earth&dquo; some day, it is these nations that are
the pioneers.
This situation offers a rare opportunity to the social scientist. If he can
positively identify these pioneering nations, he can seek the causal factors
that are leading them to be supportive of world order. And, if among these
causal factors there are policy choices not compelled by unique exigencies,
such choices may recommend themselves to men of good will in other
nations. Thus, social research may make a contribution to the cause of
world order by indicating points at which effort will be effective.
National support for world order is a concept difficult to define, yet it
must be defined if the research is to have meaning. An easy way out would
be to offer an operational definition, to say that support for world order is
what instruments used to measure it measure. But that is not good enough.
There is some notion, however vague, that dictates the selection of those
instruments. Perhaps we can approach the matter by enumerating the
terms I used at earlier stages in the research: receptivity to world
responsibilities, willingness to take world responsibilities, world-minded-
ness, and concern for world order. I gave up the first because it seemed too
passive, the second because it emphasized potentiality rather than
actuality, the third because it had a broad, intellectual focus rather than a
practical one, the fourth because the degree of national concern is too
elusive to measure reliably. I chose &dquo;support for world order&dquo; as indicating
action, not thought or feeling, and as focused on the systematic relations
among nations. National support for world order, as the criterion variable
for this research, can thus be defined as: &dquo;efforts and activities that foster
the development of a system of relations among nations capable of
creating and maintaining world peace.&dquo; Since this is a variable, its value for
any nation may be high or low. There may even be nations that actively
oppose world order.
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The first objective of the research, then, has been to obtain valid
measures of national support for world order. Since it seemed unlikely
that there is a single indicator available that would adequately represent
the central concept, I searched for several that could be used separately
and could be combined to form an index. The search was not easy,
because I wanted the ultimate generalizations to have universal scope. The
indicators chosen had therefore to be ones for which there were accurate
data for the great majority of nations. The paucity of such data has strictly
limited the number of possible indicators. Seven out of a larger number
considered have been chosen. Since work was begun in 1969 when data
were just becoming available for the middle sixties, the indicators for the
most part have been centered on the years 1963-1967.
The Dependent Variables
CONTRIBUTIONS/ASSESSMENTS
The first variable used was suggested to me by Chadwick Alger (for a
working paper discussing six of the seven separate dependent variables, see
Angell, 1971: 19-30). It is the ratio of the amount that a nation
contributes voluntarily to agencies of the UN system to its assessments for
the support of that system. The rationale was that the greater the
commitment of a nation to world order, the more of its substance it will
give freely to help create that order. The numerator of the fraction is
composed of the voluntary contributions made to the Expanded Program
of Technical Assistance, the UN Special Fund, UNICEF, and the UN/FAO
World Food Program during the years 1961-1968. The denominator is
composed of the assessments for support of the United Nations, the
International Labor Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization,
UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the International Atomic
Energy, and the International Civil Aeronautics Organization (minus the
1968 assessment for the ICAO). The ratios range from 488.77 for Norway
to 1.51 for Somalia. The basic data are drawn from the Supplements to
the Official Records of the General Assembly for the appropriate sessions
and from the issues of the UN Yearbook.
ABSENCES AND ABSTENTIONS
The second indicator is based on roll call votes in the UN General
Assembly for the fifteenth through the twenty-second sessions
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(1960-1968), and the third and fourth special sessions (1961 and
1963)-401 roll call votes in all. The handling of absences is straight-
forward : the fewer absences, the greater the nation’s assumed support for
world order. The handling of abstentions, however, is more complicated. I
have assumed that abstentions are sometimes statesmanlike acts that
express unwillingness to embrace either horn of an unwisely posed
dilemma. Inspection of the data led me to believe that approximately 15%
of all votes cast were &dquo;statesmanlike abstentions.&dquo; I reached this
conclusion because this was the point that divided the Communist nations
(all of whom had a lower rate of abstentions) from the Western nations (all
of whom had a higher rate), and because India, a then Western-leaning and
statesmanlike nation, had 16% abstentions, and Yugoslavia, a Communist
but politically independent nation, had 13.9%. This conclusion was further
buttressed by a plotting of the contributions/assessments scores against the
abstentions to determine the point at which the former were highest. It
proved to be at 15.8% abstentions. Thus, the nations showing the strongest
support on the previous indicator tended to abstain about 15% of the
time. The abstention score of a nation was made proportional to the
degree that its percentage of abstentions deviated from 15% in either
direction. Absences and abstentions were combined so as to give each
component of the indicator approximately equal weight.
DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION
The third indicator derives from data gathered by Robert Keohane
(1969) showing the average size of national delegations to the United
Nations (1961-1966), together with the data previously published by
Chadwick Alger and Steven J. Brams (1967) on numbers involved in
bilateral diplomatic representation (1963-1964). The purpose of this
indicator is to measure the relative importance nations attribute to the
United Nations in foreign policy. This is achieved by dividing the average
size of a nation’s UN delegation by the average size of its bilateral
embassies. The scores on this indicator range from 11.54 for Canada to
1.64 for South Africa.
BILATERAL TREATY REFERENCES
The fourth indicator expresses the degree to which nations agree to use
UN agencies in matters covered by bilateral treaties. The data are drawn
from the UN Treaty Project of Peter H. Rohn (1968) at the University of
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Washington. He has supervised the coding of all treaties registered with the
United Nations, and his project has made available computer printouts of
data that scholars desire. The item of particular interest here was the
number of nonnominal references to UN institutions in state-state treaties.
The measure used is the ratio of the number of such references to the
number of state-state treaties. Scores are omitted for nations having less
than ten treaties recorded. Analysis showed ’that the nations in being as
independent states in 1933 tended to have much lower ratios than those
that became independent during and after World War II. To offset this
tendency, I treated the two sets of nations as independent groups,
determining separate means and standard deviations for each group, but
consolidating the two sets of standard scores in a single array. Scores range
from .67 for Switzerland to .00 for Jamaica and Mongolia.
The first four indicators are related in one way or another to the United
Nations: financial commitment to it, voting responsibility in it, relative
diplomatic weight accorded it, and use of the UN system as an instrument
in bilateral treaties. Since the United Nations and its agencies are by no
means the only channel through which nations can work toward world
order, three other indicators were developed.
COOPERATION/CONFLICT
The assumption on which the fifth indicator is based is that nations
whose governments are cooperative bilaterally with those of other nations
are supporting world order. The data employed come from the World
Event/Interaction Survey conducted under the supervision of Charles A.
McClelland of the University of Southern California. They represent
careful coding of all copies of the New York Times for January 1966
through August 1969. Data tapes had been obtained from WEIS by
Raymond Tanter at the University of Michigan for use in his Voluntary
International Coordination Project. He kindly included a small computer
run of these data, which counted the number of cooperative and
conflictual acts and gestures for each nation toward all other nations. The
categories of cooperative and conflictual acts and gestures were deter-
mined by me after careful study of the factor analysis of McClelland and
Hoggard (1969) of the WEIS data. 1 The indicator is the number of
1. In Table 2 on page 718, the authors collapse their 65 categories into 47, of
which 25 are classified as cooperative/collaborative behavior types and 22 as
conflictual behavior types. Of these 47, 38 were accepted as classified. Seven were
omitted as ambiguous according to the authors’ factor analysis. The first 4 of these 7
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cooperative acts and gestures as a percentage of all acts and gestures in
both cooperative and conflictual categories. The scores range from 94.7
for Finland to 18.2 for El Salvador.
RED CROSS CONTRIBUTIONS
The sixth indicator consists of the contributions of the government and
people of each nation to the International Committee of the Red Cross
and associated organizations, divided by its gross national product. Since
the contributions of governments greatly exceed those from private
citizens and groups, I felt it proper to use this as an indicator of national
support. A score on Red Cross contributions is the amount subscribed for
the years 1963-1969 divided by the GNP in 1966. Switzerland has much
the highest ratio (the International Committee of the Red Cross is a Swiss
corporation). Eighteen of the 114 nations made no donation during the
seven years and thus scored 0. The data come from annual financial
reports published in the official organ of the International Committee of
the Red Cross, International Review of the Red Cross.
IGO MEMBERSHIPS
The final indicator attempts to express the support shown by nations
for intergovernmental organization outside the UN system. A review of all
such IGOs in the 1966-1967 edition of the Yearbook of International
Organizations revealed only five that had more than sixty members each
and were potentially universal in the sense that they had no regional,
religious, ideological, or ethnic basis. Also, their objectives were such as to
be potentially of interest to all nations. These organizations are the
International Bureau of Education, the International Committee of
Military Medicine and Pharmacy (which promotes professional collabora-
tion in the spirit of the Geneva Convention), the International Office of
Epizootics (which promotes research on the pathology and prophylaxis of
contagious diseases of livestock internationally), the International Union
for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, and the Permanent Court of
had been assumed to be positive: consult (host a meeting); grant (return of persons or
property); request (information or policy assistance); and request (material assist-
ance). The last three had been assumed to be negative: protest (complain); warn; and
reduce relationship (cancel planned event). Two categories that had been assumed to
be negative had factor loadings that persuaded me to regard them as positive: deny
(accusation); and deny (policy, action).
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Arbitration. Scores were assigned from 0 to 5 according to the number of
these organizations to which nations belonged.
RELATIONS AMONG THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The 114 nations that could be scored on five or more of these seven
indicators of national support for world order are included in this study.
Of these, four are not members of the United Nations and do not,
therefore, have scores on absences and abstentions. They do, however,
have contributions/assessments scores because they belong to Specialized
Agencies of the UN system. All 114 nations have scores on IGO
memberships also. One nation (Mongolia) has no score on Red Cross
contributions because its GNP was not recorded. For want of the
necessary data, there are only 100 nations on diplomatic representation,
and 88 on cooperation/conflict. Because nations with fewer than 10
treaties recorded were omitted, there are only 94 nations on bilateral
treaty references. All correlations are based on only those nations that
have scores on each of the variables being correlated.
Since the indicators are all assumed to refer to national support for
world order, it becomes important to see to what extent they are in fact
interrelated. Table 1 gives the intercorrelation matrix. It will be seen that
TABLE 1
INTERCORRELATIONS OF SEVEN INDICATORS OF NATIONAL SUPPORT
FOR WORLD ORDER
NOTE: N varies between 79 and 114. For those interested in statistical significance
levels, coefficients above .25 would be significant at the .O1 level (one-tailed test).
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six of the seven indicators are positively related to one another in every
case. Red Cross contributions is the only one that has negative relations:
-.06 with absences and abstentions, and -.16 with diplomatic represen-
tation. The fact that in these instances an indicator not involving the
United Nations is being related to two indicators that do involve the
United Nations suggests the advisability of looking at the correlations
within each of these two groups and between them. The mean of the six
correlations among United Nations-related indicators is .25; that of the
three correlations among non-united Nations-related indicators is .11; and
that of the twelve correlations that bridge the two groups is .16. These
results are not surprising since the non-United Nations-related indicators
could hardly be more dissimilar. The mean correlation for all 21
correlations is .18. This shows that the indicators are fairly independent of
one another and thus express different facets of support for world order.
Since even the most divergent one-Red Cross contributions-has a mean
positive correlation of .08 with the others, it can be said to be a valid, if
weak, indicator of national support for world order.
From the start, I wanted to develop and use an Index of National
Support for World Order in addition to using the separate indicators. The
question arises: Should such an index be weighted or unweighted?
Although a weighted index based on the strength of intercorrelations
among the indicators themselves was developed and used in the early
analysis, it has been abandoned in favor of an unweighted index because
the latter makes fewer assumptions and because the multiple correlation of
the independent variables with it is only slightly lower than that with the
weighted index. The score for each nation on the unweighted index,
hereafter called the NSWO Index, is simply the mean of the standard
scores on the indicators available for each nation-usually seven, but in
some cases six or five.
Scores on the NSWO Index are given in Table 2. They offer an
opportunity for those knowledgeable about international affairs to judge
the validity of the index. A few observations may aid that judgment. The
five Scandinavian nations rank at 2, 3, 4, 20, and 27. The British
Commonwealth nations spread from Canada at rank 7 to Malta at rank
114; the Arab nations, from Kuwait at 5 to Yemen at 108. The six original
Common Market nations are found at from 8 to 55, and the members of
the Communist bloc from 51 to 112. Yugoslavia, however, is at rank 28.
Latin American nations spread from Colombia at 31 to El Salvador at 110.
It is worthwhile to note that, as is to be expected when seven indicators
are being combined, the distribution of scores is very compressed.
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Although the scores for each indicator were computed so as to have a
mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10, the NSWO Index scores have a
standard deviation of only 5.56 from mean of 49.90. There are only 12
nations scoring more than one standard deviation above the mean and 16
nations scoring more than one standard deviation below. That three
Scandinavian nations are among the top four and nations from three
continents are among the bottom four are points of interest.
The Independent Variables
The procedure used in this analysis, the examination of hypotheses
with simple and multiple correlations between the chosen independent
variables (predictors) and the dependent variables (the NSWO Index and
its component elements), may appear to some to be a simplistic approach
to the problem. The use of modern procedures for examination of the
structure of causal relations such as path analysis and the use of various
forms of time-series analysis are left to those who can obtain more
accurate data and develop more refined theoretical formulations of the
problem. I saw no utility for such methods given the data which are
analyzed here.
For the dependent variables, the main problem was to obtain valid
indicators of the central concept, national support for world order. For
the independent variables, the problem has been quite different-to find a
small set of national characteristics that would be maximally predictive of
scores on the seven separate indicators and the NSWO Index. Since the
criterion variables express governmental policy, the predictors may be any
characteristics of the nation that might affect that policy. The search for a
set of predictors has been guided by social science theory. Since the
power, jointly and severally, of the predictors is most easily shown by
multiple regression analysis, and since accurate specification of the power
of each predictor separately requires that predictors be fairly independent
of each other (not closely correlated), a second aim has been to find
predictors possessed of such independence. The second objective, unfor-
tunately, has not been reached.
INGO PARTICIPATION
The research for Angell (1969) indicated that transnational participa-
tion of several kinds probably had significant influence on national foreign
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TABLE 2




policy. The easiest of these to measure for the nations of the world was
participation of nationals in international nongovernmental organizations
(formerly labeled NGOs, more recently INGOs). In each edition of the
Yearbook of International Organizations, there is listed for each organi-
zation the countries from which membership in that organization is drawn.
The memberships may represent national groups-as, for instance, the
American Sociological Association in the International Sociological Associ-
ation-or they may represent individual citizens. Using the 1966-1967
edition of the Yearbook, I counted the INGOs of universal rather than
regional scope in which each nation is represented, within the following
sections of the Yearbook: Bibliography, press; Social sciences; Interna-
tional Relations; Agriculture; Transport, travel; Technology; Science;
Education, youth; Health, medicine; Arts, literature, radio; and Sport,
recreation. The following sections were omitted because they were not as
applicable to nationals of all countries of the world as were those in the
first set, and their inclusion might therefore bias the results: Religion,
ethics; Politics; Law, administration; Social welfare; Professions, em-
ployers ; Trade Unions; Economics, finance; and Commerce, industry.
There were 523 appropriate INGOs listed in the sections covered. The
scores, ranging from 495 for France to 0 for Yemen, were standardized.
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ENLIGHTENMENT
Karl Deutsch (1953: 126-130) demonstrates that citizen mobilization
for intense social communication is significant for intelligent participation
in the modern world. He emphasizes the reading of newspapers, listening
to radio, and elementary education. Building on this idea, I constructed a
predictor labeled enlightenment which combines the national data for
newspapers per 1,000 population, radios per 1,000 population, and
adjusted school enrollment, all for 1965, from Taylor and Hudson (1972).
The national scores in each series were transformed into an array with
mean 50 and standard deviation 10 and added.
URGENCY OF FOREIGN TRADE
The third predictor is derived from a suggestion of Johan Galtung
(1967: 311-312). He theorized that a small country with a high gross
national product per capita must engage in international trade to reap the
benefits of its high division of labor. Conversely, a large nation with a low
gross national product per capita does not have the means of developing an
efficient domestic market, let alone import much from abroad. I have
operationalized this idea by using the ratio of GNP per capita (1966) to
the population of each nation (data are from the UN Statistical
Yearbook). It seemed to me, however, that this predictor should also
contain as a second component some measure of actual foreign trade, since
the tendency to desire a stable world order is affected not merely by the
need for trade but by the habit of it. Foreign trade is measured by the sum
of imports and exports (1966) per capita (data from the same source). I
standardized both components and, in the final composite index, added
them together, but weighted the first (Galtung) part twice as heavily as the
second.
POPULATION PRESSURE
The fourth predictor is negative rather than positive. It posits an
obstacle to the support of world order rather than something conducive to
it. The obstacle envisaged is population pressure. The hypothesis is that
the more severe the population pressure, the fewer will be the resources,
human and material, to support anything so remote as world order.
Population pressure, however, is not just a matter of the rate of population
growth. It is less or greater according to the nation’s ability to cope win
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that growth. Population pressure has, therefore, been operationalized as
the ratio of the standardized annual rate of growth (1960-1965) to the
standardized measure of GNP per capita (1965); (data are from the UN
Demographic Yearbook).
PRODUCTIVITY RELATIVE TO REFERENCE NATIONS
The fifth and last predictor reflects a hypothesis somewhat inverse to
that of population pressure. Whereas population pressure is hypothesized
to distract attention and effort from global concerns, including support for
world order, economic success relative to that of other nations felt to be
&dquo;in the same league&dquo; is hypothesized to give a nation a sense of status
among nations that leads it to participate in efforts to realize a more
orderly world. The emphasis on other nations &dquo;in the same league&dquo; is
important because it brings in the concept of reference group or category
in a way that population pressure does not. There is little sense of relative
deprivation under conditions of population pressure; the handicap may
not be formulated at all. Relative economic success, however, is likely to
be a source of pride, and relative failure a source of chagrin to informed
citizens.
The reference groups chosen for this predictor are as follows: (1) the
Latin American nations (21), including those in Central America, the
Caribbean, and South America; (2) the developed Western nations (28),
including West European nations, and South Africa, United States,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel, and Turkey, (3) Communist
Eurasian nations (9), including Yugoslavia and Mongolia; (4) Asian and
North African nations (28), excluding Japan, Israel, and Turkey; and (5)
sub-Saharan African nations (28), excluding South Africa. The scores on
this predictor were developed from the ranks in each group. The top
nations in each were scored 1.000. Other scores depend on the number of
nations in the group. Albania, for instance, the lowest in a group of nine,
was scored .125, whereas Upper Volta, the lowest in a group of 28, was
scored .037. These scores were then standardized.
REJECTED PREDICTORS
The five predictors that have been adopted were selected from a larger
number considered. Some of the latter were rejected because data were
not available for enough countries. Others either were so closely related to
one of the five selected as to provide no new leverage or had correlations
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with the NSWO Index markedly inferior to those of the five. A list of
these also-rans, together with the reasons for exploring each of them,
follows:
(1) Military power (military manpower per capita, defense expenditures per
capita, and defense expenditures/GNP); as representing a form of national-
ism antithetical to support for world order.
(2) Internal security forces per square kilometer; as measuring domestic
problems that would detract from support for world order.
(3) Domestic violence; as measuring domestic problems that would detract from
support for world order.
(4) Political instability and social tension; as measuring social problems that
would detract from support for world order.
(5) National dependence on one or more sponsoring countries; as relieving the
nation of responsibility to support world order.
(6) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; as making fractionalized nations more
aware of the need for order at any level.
(7) Immigration; as bringing home to a nation the variety of peoples in the
world and hence the need for world order.
(8) Years as an independent country; as measuring political maturity and hence
awareness of the need for world order.
(9) The Political Representation Index developed by Phillips Cutright (1965:
app. B) and used in the early stages of this research, but abandoned because
it overlapped so heavily with enlightenment and INGO participation; as
measuring domestic pluralism, a condition assumed to be conducive to
participation in a collective world system.
(10) Degree of polyarchy of political system; as an alternative to the Political
Representation Index (above).
(11) &dquo;PICA&dquo; Press Freedom Index; as an alternative to the Political Representa-
tion Index (above).
(12) Students abroad; as an alternative to INGO Participation.
Relations of the Predictors to the
Seven Separate Indicators
The first step in analyzing the research results is to examine the matrix
of correlations between the independent and the dependent variables. This
matrix is given in Table 3.
In examining the correlations it must be remembered that population
pressure is different from the other four predictors in that it is
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TABLE 3
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE PREDICTORS AND THE SEVEN SEPARATE
INDICATORS
NOTE: N varies between 88 and 114. For those interested in statistical significance
levels, coefficients as high as .25 would be significant at the .0 1 level (one-tailed test).
hypothesized to have a negative effect on the indicators. Hence its (very
slight) positive correlation with cooperation/conflict is unexpected.
Other results contrary to the hypotheses are the trivial negative correlations
between urgency of foreign trade and diplomatic representation, and
INGO participation and Red Cross contributions (-.004).
It is apparent that the independent variables collectively are most
successful in predicting contributions/assessments and IGO memberships.
They are least successful in predicting Red Cross contributions and
bilateral treaty references. Of the individual predictors, INGO participa-
tion is evidently the most powerful, and population pressure the least. It is
noticeable that enlightenment has much the same pattern of relations with
the indicators as INGO participation, but at a lower level of correlation.
Urgency of trade and productivity relative to reference nations show some,
but less, similarity of pattern.
These relationships are shown in a different way in Figure 1, which is
based on all correlations of the predictors of more than .20, both with the
’separate indicators and the NSWO Index. It is evident from Figure 1 that
there is a broad tendency for enlightenment and INGO participation to
predict cooperation/conflict, diplomatic representation, and IGO member-
ships, and for urgency of trade and productivity relative to reference
nations to predict bilateral treaty references, absences and abstentions, and
Red Cross contributions, with both pairs predicting contributions/assess-
ments. The reasons for this broad tendency are not apparent. The single


































































and abstentions, is also puzzling. It would be tempting to say that nations
suffering from population pressure are unable to man their UN delegation
were it not for the weak relationship between population pressure and
diplomatic representation. On the other hand, the single highest correla-
tion in the matrix, that between INGO participation and IGO member-
ships, is easily understood. The degree to which citizens of a nation have
joined international nongovernmental organizations is likely to be re-
flected in the degree to which their governments join international
governmental organizations.
Relations of the Predictors to the NSWO Index
The relation between the five predictors and the NSWO Index is
complex and somewhat puzzling. To grasp its ramifications requires a step
by step presentation. First, then, the zero-order correlations between the
several predictors and the NSWO Index and the coefficients of determi-
nation (correlations squared) are shown in Table 4.
For relations among sociological variables, these are gratifying correla-
tions. When it is recalled that the percentage proportion of the total
variance of the criterion variables that is accounted for by each of the
predictors is the square of the correlation coefficient, we note that INGO
participation accounts for almost 32%. And even urgency of foreign trade
accounts for almost 10%. Were the five predictors not correlated with one
another, we would be able to explain more than three-quarters of the
variance in the NSWO Index. Unfortunately, the linear regression model of
the relationships among these variables suffers from multicollinearity-i.e.,
high correlations among independent variables, making it impossible to
partition accurately the variance accounted for by the model among the
predictors.
TABLE 4
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PREDICTORS AND THE NSWO INDEX
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The two correlations that may be surprising are those for INGO
participation and urgency of foreign trade. International nongovernmental
organizations are generally regarded as having little influence on govern-
ments, whereas foreign trade is often regarded as significant to them.
It may be thought that the high correlation of INGO participation is in
reality a case of reciprocal influence-that governments that support world
order encourage their citizens to participate in INGOs, as well as the
reverse. I attempted to examine this possibility by looking at the INGO
scores of the Communist countries. It is usually assumed that they have
discouraged their citizens from participating in international nongovern-
mental organizations (we know that they have often frowned upon their
going abroad to attend meetings). We should therefore expect, if
government policy is having an effect, that the rank of the Communist
nations for INGO participation would be no higher than their rank on the
NSWO Index. To my surprise, each of them except Albania had a higher
rank on INGO participation that on the NSWO Index. In other words,
there was no evidence that governmental policy is operating as a causal
factor to keep down the INGO participation score.
Another possibility is that it is not the INGO participation itself that is
having the marked effect but some factor or factors lying behind it,
influencing both it and the NSWO Index. This possibility will be discussed
after the analysis has been carried further.
The modest influence of urgency of foreign trade perhaps results from a
feeling among governmental policy makers that the embodiment of the
principle of freedom of the seas in international law already gives
protection, so that no further strengthening of world order at this point is
needed.
One has only to look at the lack of independence among the predictors
as shown in Table 5 to realize that enlightenment is heavily overlapped
TABLE 5
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG THE PREDICTORS
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with INGO Participation, urgency of foreign trade, and productivity
relative to reference nations. Population pressure is clearly the predictor
most independent of the others.
Multiple regression is the common technique for obtaining both the
joint power of the independent variables in predicting the criterion
variable and in determining the special contribution of each. The lack of
independence among the predictors causes no problem for reaching the
first objective, but it raises real obstacles to reaching the second. These
obstacles will be considered after a brief discussion of the coefficient of
multiple correlation.
A multiple correlation coefficient ignores the degree of independence
of the predictors and simply states the degree of influence of all of them
together on the criterion variable. In the present case, the multiple
correlation with the NSWO Index is .69. Squaring this, we see that all the
predictors together explain 47% of the variance among the nations on the
NSWO Index. In other words, more than half the variance is due to other
factors not represented in the five predictors. This is somewhat disappoint-
ing, but is perhaps not surprising when one considers the multitude of
influence that can affect a government’s foreign policy.
Knowing the total effect of five predictors does not help as much in
explaining the NSWO Index scores of the 114 nations as would knowing
the contribution made by each. But when the predictors are not
independent, there is no theoretically satisfying way by which to
apportion accurately the influence represented by their overlap. To the
degree that two predictors are overlapped, they are each representing the
same force or influence, and they are doing so inseparably. Because of this,
we must approach the problem in roundabout fashion. We will first
discover the unique contribution of each predictor by comparing the
amount by which the coefficient of determination of all five predictors
taken together is reduced when a particular predictor is omitted from the
calculation. This procedure reveals the amount this predictor contributes
to the variance in the NSWO Index, apart from any overlap it has with
other predictors. We can then discover the amount of variance that it
shares with other predictors by subtracting this unique contribution from
the simple coefficient of determination between it and the NSWO Index
(see the second column, table 6). When this is done for the five predictors
successively, it turns out that the overlaps are very great-nearly four times
the explained variance left unexplained (.08) by the unique contributions.
(If no predictor were overlapped with more than one other
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unexplained by the unique contributions. Hence, it is clear that predictors
are overlapped more extensively than that, as is suggested by the
correlations in Table 5.) We are therefore faced with the necessity of
apportioning the explained variance unexplained by the unique contri-
butions to the five predictors in some rational manner. The first method
chosen is that of parcelling out this variance in accordance with the
proportions of total overlap evidenced for each predictor. The proportion
of overlap thus assigned to each predictor can then be added to the unique
contribution of that predictor to yield an estimate of the amount of the
total variance in the NSWO Index for which that predictor is responsible.
The third and fourth columns of figures in Table 6 show the result of these
procedures.
It can be argued that enlightenment, the predictor that has by far the
most overlap, is a basic condition for INGO participation, productivity,
foreign trade, and wide use of contraception and should therefore be
allocated a greater than proportional share of the overlap. I have therefore
made an alternative apportionment of the variance, shown in the last two
columns of Table 6. There enlightenment is accorded credit, so to speak,
for all the overlap in which it participates (87% of the total). The
remaining share of the overlap is distributed among the other four
predictors proportionally to their overlaps in column 2 of Table 6. The
second procedure as compared with the first affects the general picture
most dramatically by raising the estimated contribution of enlightenment
to the explained variance in the NSWO Index from .076 to .115. Even so,
INGO participation still makes a much greater contribution.
No matter how one looks at the results, it is clear that INGO
participation is outstanding in significance. Its unique contribution alone is
greater than the total contribution of any other predictor. A possible
explanation of this rather surprising finding is that in the conferences and
other activities sponsored by international nongovernmental organizations
participants from different countries learn to work together and to
appreciate one another’s cultures. My earlier research supports this
conclusion (Angell, 1969: ch. 9). It is probable that other forms of
transnational participation examined in that work, such as study abroad,
would also have correlated well with the NSWO Index if worldwide data
had been available.
The three predictors next in their contributions to the variance in the
NSWO Index are urgency of trade, enlightenment, and productivity
relative to reference nations. Since the true significance of these three
probably lies somewhere between the figures produced by the two
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procedures of calculation, we can perhaps say that they are roughly equal
in influence. This rough equality represents a greater significance for
urgency of foreign trade than would appear from its coefficient of
determination with the NSWO Index in Table 4 (.10), and less significance
for enlightenment, whose coefficient was .19. These shifts are, of course,
due to the considerably larger unique contribution of the former
compared with that of the latter.
Table 5 shows that INGO participation and enlightenment are the most
closely linked two predictors. This is in line with common sense. One
would expect that the higher the level of enlightenment, the greater would
be concern for world order. Enlightened populations would be prone to
participation in international nongovernmental organizations, in part
simply because they are in the network of world communication and in
part because they see INGOs as bringing the peoples of the world closer
together. There is probably some reverse influence also. Nations whose
citizens have participated widely in INGOs are likely to be very aware of
the importance in the modern world of schooling and the diffusion of
information through the mass media.
The determination that foreign trade is a significant influence needs
little comment. Perhaps the smallness of its contribution to the variance in
the NSWO Index is the most interesting discovery made.
The result on productivity relative to reference nations lends support to
the hypothesis that nations respond to relative economic success compared
with other nations that they use as points of reference. It suggests that
exploration to determine whether other kinds of world data would benefit
from reference group analysis would be worthwhile.
Population pressure makes a very small contribution to the variance in
the NSWO Index despite the fact that it is quite independent of the other
predictors. Its zero-order correlation with the NSWO Index is so low that
the connection between the two does not qualify for representation in
Figure 1.
Together, INGO participation and urgency of foreign trade can account
for 76% of the explained variance in the NSWO Index. The combined
unique contributions of the other three predictors is only .11 (24%) out of
a total explained variance of .47. Thus, we have discovered two principal
factors accounting for the NSWO scores, one much stronger than the
other. The weaker represents participation in the world economy. The
stronger represents both domestic and global social mobilization-enlight-
enment, and participation in international nongovernmental organizations.
These are so typically modern phenomena that one is tempted to say that
they are the wave of the future.
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Practical Implications of the Analysis
As stated earlier, this research has been aimed at contributing to the
attainment of a more orderly world. The hope has been to learn what
influences have brought some nations to support world order strongly so
that men of good will in all nations might have guidance in choosing
promising national policies.
How far down this road has the analysis brought us? Remembering that
only 47% of the variance on the Index of National Support for World
Order is accounted for by the five predictors that have been isolated, we
cannot claim that it has carried us far. Yet, almost halfway is more than a
start.
One of the encouraging features of the situation is that none of the five
predictors is a national characteristic that is unchangeable, that could not
be affected by public policy. We can therefore profitably discuss the
implications of the findings as they relate to each predictor in turn.
Despite the considerable redundancy with INGO participation, it is
obvious that the components of enlightenment-education and the mass
media-are key building blocks in constructing an edifice of national
concern for world order. This is encouraging, since no trends in the
modern world are more consistent than the rising level of education and
the increase in exposure to the mass media. These are trends that citizens
concerned with realization of world order should find it easy to further,
since they already have great momentum.
The significance of participation in international nongovernmental
organizations has been clearly demonstrated, and there is, hence, a clear
implication for policy. It would be conducive to world order if men of
good will themselves joined such organizations or their national affiliates
and encouraged by every possible means others to do likewise. The most
strategic organizations are those that are worldwide in membership and
free of the taint of ideology-political, racial, or religious. Since free
governments cannot force such participation, and since, if forced by
authoritarian governments, it would probably be less productive, the onus
fpr furthering such a policy is on individual citizens and voluntary groups.
Inversely, such groups can perform a vital service by preventing their
governments from forbidding participation.
Because productivity relative to reference nations is a competitive
concept, it is a moot question whether encouragement of productivity will
have any general effect of increasing support for world order. Skeptics
might say that relative position within the &dquo;league&dquo; is all that counts and
that, for every nation that improves its position, another nation must
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decline in status. The counter-argument would be that competition will
raise the whole level of productivity in the group of nations and that the
rising level will inevitably bring with it an absolute increase in concern for
world problems. From this standpoint, attempts to promote economic
progress would pay off in terms of support for world order.
Although population pressure turned out to be a predictor of little
significance, reduction of such pressure can be directly addressed in birth
control and other reform programs. Moreover, there are other problems
that I was unable to deal with for lack of data that may very well be
distracting nations from their responsibility to further world order.
Indeed, it is likely that any severe domestic problem tends to have this
effect. No doubt the principal spur to alleviation of such problems will be
worry about the domestic situation, but some citizens may be stimulated
to added effort by the hope that success will also make possible greater
national attention to global problems.
Urgency of foreign trade is probably the predictor least susceptible of
intentional change, and, for that reason, it has fewer practical implications
than do the others. Countries for the most part trade because trade will be
beneficial to their economies. They are likely to do little more of it simply
because this may have some influence toward world order.
Unfinished Business
Some may hold that there is little chance of advancing farther along the
track so far pursued. Perhaps a large share of the 53% unexplained variance
in the NSWO Index results from idiosyncratic conditions in particular
countries that cannot be described in general terms and operationalized in
predictors like those used here. Or a share of that variance may result from
the particular relations of the members of pairs of nations, relations that
would be impossible to deal with in worldwide terms.
Though undoubtedly such circumstances will prevent very high levels of
prediction of national support for world order, it seems too early to
conclude that we cannot improve on what has been accomplished here. A
first step would be to see which nations’ NSWO Index scores were least
well predicted by our multiple regression equation. These are the nations
on which unknown influences are having the greatest effect. They are
revealed when their actual NSWO scores are compared with the scores that
can be predicted from their scores on the five predictors, using the
regression equation. In Table 7 are listed the nine nations whose actual
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TABLE 7
NATIONS WITH LARGEST GAPS BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PREDICTED
NSWO INDEX SCORES
scores exceeded their predicted scores by more than one standard
deviation on the scale in Table 2 and the twelve whose actual scores fell
below their predicted scores by a like amount. Switzerland, whose gap is
the widest in the first group, was in 1965 presumably being most affected
by unknown positive influences. France, with the widest gap in the second
group, was then presumably being most affected by unknown negative
influences.
To find explanations for the unknown influence operating to produce
these divergences, two courses are open. One is to attempt to obtain global
data for those predictors that were abandoned for lack of such data. Of
the twelve potential predictors listed, three were of this kind-immigra-
tion, the &dquo;PICA&dquo; Press Freedom Index, and students abroad. A number of
other possibilities that required survey research data were never explored
because it was known that such data were not available in many of the less
developed countries. Any attempt to explore these possibilities will have
to await the gathering of added data by existing international, national,
and private agencies and the establishment in many countries of new
facilities for data collection.
Another line of attack is to study carefully the 21 countries in Table 7
in the hope of hitting upon new hypotheses about the causes of national
support for world order that can be tested. This appears to be the most
promising line to follow. It may well be that case studies in depth will have
to be undertaken before new fruitful hypotheses can be adumbrated.
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